A Keynesian Solution to Classical Unemployment by Keith MacKinnon





In a classical macroeconomic model, the real wage equals labor's
marginal product and the real interest rate can fall no lower than the
rate of investment. These rigidities may prevent labor market clearing.
Economies with rapid labor supply growth, capital immobility and a
low capital labor ratio will be prone to such `classical unemployment'.
Downward °exibility in real wages restores full employment, lowers
real interest rates and stimulates investment provided that ¯rms also
perceive that they are rationed in output sales. Such quantity con-
straints have been identi¯ed by Clower (1965) as a critical feature in
Keynes (1936).
¤York University1 Introduction
In the classical macroeconomic model, labor and capital produce output
which can be consumed or added to the capital stock. The level and allo-
cation of output are determined in markets with °exible prices and factors
are rewarded according to their marginal products. The standard Keynesian
criticism of this model is that employment and output may stay persistently
below their classical levels because of demand constraints on output sales.
The usual reasons cited for such `lack of e®ective demand' include price rigidi-
ties, dim investment prospects, low real wages and portfolio balance decisions
holding interest rates above their `natural' level.
This paper presents a macroeconomic model in which most of these roles
are reversed. Persistent unemployment may result because of the equality
of the real wage and the marginal product of labor (`the ¯rst classical pos-
tulate' of Keynes, 1936). Moreover, an economy experiencing such `classical
unemployment' will also have a low investment rate and a high real interest
rate since the latter must exceed the former for pro¯t to be positive. The
source of these outcomes is not lack of e®ective demand for output but rather
capital immobility between the consumption and capital sectors and an ag-
gregate capital labor ratio which is `low' in a sense to be made precise. The
model predicts that economies with rapid labor supply growth and a low
capital stock (per capita) weighted heavily in the capital sector will be prone
to classical unemployment.
1The second principal result is that if real wages are °exible below labor's
marginal product, then classical unemployment and its associated investment
and interest raterigidities can be eliminated. In the resulting full employment
equilibrium, however, competitive ¯rms will be demand constrained; that
is, rationed in their output sales. Because agent optimization in the face
of rationing (or `quantity constraints') is fundamental to Robert Clower's
in°uential interpretation of Keynes (Clower 1965), such a full employment
equilibrium will be termed `Keynesian'.
The potential for classical unemployment and Keynesian full employment
stands in sharp contrast with the conclusions of the disequilibrium literature
(Barro and Grossman 1971, Benassy 1975, Malinvaud 1977) which emanated
from Clower's paper. In that literature, price rigidities produce a taxon-
omy of non-Walrasian equilibria and, in the `Keynesian regime', quantity
constraints on output sales coincide with an excess supply of labor. In the
present model, such demand constraints are required to eliminate classical
unemployment under price °exibility.1 In the `classical regime' of that liter-
ature, the real wage is ¯xed at such a high level that while the usual ¯rst
order conditions of ¯rms can be satis¯ed, households ¯nd themselves rationed
on both output and labor markets. Classical unemployment in the present
model cannot be alleviated by a lower real wage if labor's marginal product
falls proportionately with it.
1Clower (1965) does not refer to price rigidities in his interpretation of Keynes.
2At center stage in the analysis is the neoclassical theory of investment
(Lucas 1967, Uzawa 1969, Purvis 1976) in which the acquisition of capital
is spread out through time because of increasing marginal installation costs.
In this paper, production of net output (i.e., gross output less that absorbed
by installation or `adjustment' costs) displays constant returns to scale. If
the real wage equals labor's marginal product then the marginal product
of installed capital must be large enough to ¯nance both the purchase and
installation of new capital. Classical unemployment results because for any
initial allocation of installed capital between the capital and consumption
sectors, there is no assurance that this ¯nancing requirement can be met and
¯rms still pro¯tably absorb the full employment output of the capital sector.
This problem does not arise in the in°uential macro model with adjust-
ment costs of Uzawa (1969). There, output is a homogeneous product of a
one sector production function; it is `as if' installed capital can be instantly
and costlessly shifted between sectors. In Mussa (1976), adjustment costs
cause capital stock immobility between ¯rms, but a ¯rm can produce ei-
ther output implying mobile, intra-¯rm capital. In Mussa (1977), there is
an explicit two sector macro model with adjustment costs, but the capital
sector employs no capital. As we shall see, this is a (more than) su±cient
assumption to obviate the problem.
In this paper, a Keynesian solution is proposed. Real wages fall below
labor's marginal product and thereby generate additional rent to ¯nance the
3full employment output of the capital sector. Investment is stimulated and
real interest rates reduced. Since ¯rms (rationally) predict that they will
be sales constrained at output levels consistent with full employment, their
input choices do not satisfy the classical marginal productivity conditions.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the microfounda-
tions of ¯rm behaviour are examined. A full employment macro equilibrium
is presented in the third section, where the `Keynesian' and `classical' are the
two nested cases. The ¯nal section contains concluding remarks.
2 Microfoundations
Consider the neoclassical investment model. A representative ¯rm in
discrete time (index t) maximizes its present real value Vt with discount rate
½t. It chooses labor Nt with real wage !t and the growth rate ®t in its




¡1fF(Nt;Kt) ¡ ¸(®t)Kt ¡ ®tKt ¡ !tNt
+ Ãt[Qt ¡ (F(Nt;Kt) ¡ ¸(®t)Kt)] + V (Kt+1;Zt+1)g: (1)
The gross output function F(¢) is linearly homogeneous with positive and
diminishing marginal products. Adjustment costs ¸(®t)Kt are gross output
lost in the installation of new capital where (letting 0 denote di®erentiation)
¸0;¸00 > 0 and lim®!0¸ = lim®!0¸0 = 0. New capital purchased ®tKt
takes one period to install so that Kt+1 = Kt(1 + ®t). Capital is immobile
4in the sense that it may only produce the output of the sector (capital or
consumption) in which it was ¯rst installed. Depreciation, debt and taxes
are ignored for simplicity. The upper bound (if any) to sales in period t is Qt
where Ãt is the shadow price of such a constraint. The expected ¯rm value
next period is V (Kt+1;Zt+1) where Zt+1 denotes expected future values of
wages, sales constraints, etc.
The relative price of output sold to new capital bought is one in all
periods. This is because (1) describes the objective of competitive ¯rms in
either the capital or consumption sectors and both outputs are produced by
an identical, constant returns to scale technology.2 This is consistent with
the static theory of the ¯rm where relative prices re°ect relative marginal
costs. A formal derivation of the unit relative price in the present dynamic
context is found in the Appendix.
The ¯rst order conditions for Nt and ®t are
FNt = !t(1 ¡ Ãt)
¡1; (2)
V (¢t+1)Kt+1 + Ãt¸
0
t = 1 + ¸
0
t (3)
(a subscript denotes a partial derivative and ¢¿ means the arguments of a
function evaluated in period ¿). Di®erentiation of the maximized value of
(1) with respect to Kt and substitution of (2) and (3) yield the discrete time
2The two goods are distinguished in use by some costless characteristic. For example,
consumption goods are blue marbles produced by labor and installed red marbles. It takes
a period to install newly produced red marbles in either sector with installation costs in
the form of lost (gross) output of the purchasing ¯rm.
5equivalent of the continuous time Euler equation,
V (¢t+1)Kt+1 ¡ V (¢t)Kt = ½t V (¢t)Kt ¡(FKt + ®t¸
0
t ¡ ¸t)(1 ¡ Ãt): (4)
2.1 The Classical Firm
Consider the ¯rm's choices of Nt and ®t if it perceives no sales constraints.
With Ãt = 0 for all t, the solution for Nt re°ects Keynes' `¯rst classical
postulate': from (2), the marginal product of labor equals the real wage.
The solution method for ®t is more complex. An important initial result
is that in the limit; that is, for ®t¡1 = ®t, pro¯t in any period is only positive
if ½t > ®t. To see this, substitute (3) and its t¡1 counterpart into (4) to get
the ¯rst order di®erence equation
½t ¡ FKt + ¸
0
t¡1(1 + ½t) = ¸
0
t(1 + ®t) ¡ ¸t (5)
(where given !t determines FKt). Next, eliminate time subscripts in (5) and
rearrange it as FK = ½+¸+¸0(½¡®). From Euler's Theorem and (2), pro¯t
is (FKt ¡ ¸t ¡ ®t)Kt. Substituting for FKt from the previous expression, we
get (½t ¡ ®t)(1 + ¸0
t)Kt which is positive only if ½t > ®t.
Figure 1 about here
Consider the solution for limit ® assuming the explicit form ¸(®t) = b®2
t.
The RHS of (5) becomes g(®t) ´ 2b®t +b®2
t and its LHS is h(®t¡1; ½t;!t) ´
(½¡FK)+(1+½)2b®t¡1. As shown in Figure 1, there are two limit solutions:
6® = ½t § (½2
t ¡ (FKt ¡ ½t)=b))
1
2: The larger root is stable but greater than ½t
which implies a loss as we have seen. The smaller root is the limit solution
for ®. More important, it is a saddle point. The solution3 for ®t in any t is
found from (5) with ®t¡1 = ®t, assuming that it is less than or equal to ½t.
Consistent with Lucas (1967) and Uzawa (1969), it is helpful to arrange (5)





= ½t; (where ½t ¸ ®t): (6)
2.2 The Keynesian Firm
This ¯rm faces a sales constraint Qt less than its classical net output and
so Ãt > 0 in (2) and (3).5 Given its intertemporal objective, solutions for Nt
and ®t will depend on both current and anticipated future sales constraints.
In t, we have Qt = [f(nt) ¡ ¸(®t)]Kt where f(¢) is the intensive form gross
production function (with nt ´ Nt=Kt) and we now specify that the ¯rm
expects the same sales constraint intensity, qt ´ Qt=Kt, will exist in all
3A solution may not exist; if FK > b½2 +½, then h(:) lies below g(:) in Figure 1 and all
roots in (5) are imaginary. Existence is discussed in the next section.
4Our (6) is Uzawa's (50): (FK¡')(½¡®)¡1 = '0 where ' ´ ¸+®. Clearly ½ > ®. Our
(2) (with Ãt = 0) and (6) correspond to (8) and (9) in Lucas (1967). His (9) is displayed as
Figure 1 in that paper. He speci¯es the adjustment cost curvature properties as above plus
the restriction: ¸0 ¡! 1 as ® ¡! ¯ ´ ½ + ¾ ¡ Á, where ¾ is the depreciation rate (zero
here) and Á is \some positive number" (Lucas 1967, p. 325). Lucas does not comment
on the motive for this restriction. However, bounding the domain of the adjustment cost
function from above by ½ implies the `no loss' condition: ½ > ®. An explicit form consistent
with this speci¯cation is ¸(®t) = ®t lnf¯=(¯ ¡ ®t)g. If FK > ½ then h(:) intersects g(:)
once from below; i.e., a saddle point solution exists.
5To interpret (3) here, note that its LHS is the bene¯t of an additional unit of installed
capital in t+1 and the second term states that such an increase will reduce net sales in t
by ¸0
t below the sales constraint which has a shadow price of Ãt.
7future periods ¿. Sales constraints are thus expected to grow at the same
rate chosen for the capital stock (but no faster; there is still a constraint).
While this speci¯cation appears arbitrary, it is shown in the next section to
be consistent with the expectation of a full employment, Keynesian macro
equilibrium. For given q, pairs (nt;®t) which satisfy f(nt)¡¸(®t) = q appear
in Figure 2 as the function nt = l(®t; q).
Figure 2 about here
In the next section's discussion of Keynesian macroeconomic equilibrium,
only steady states are considered and so we assume here that !; n and ½
are identical in adjacent periods. This implies, from (2), that Ãt¡1 = Ãt.
Substitution of this equality as well as (2), (3) and their t ¡ 1 versions into
(4) yields the Keynesian counterpart of (5):
µFNt
!t




t¡1(1 + ½t) = ¸
0
t(1 + ®t) ¡¸t: (7)
For given nt, (7) resembles (5) displayed in Figure 1 (they are identical if
FN = !). Considering only the steady-state case of ®t = ®t¡1, inspection of
Figure 1 reveals (noting that the ¯rst term on the LHS of (7) varies inversely
with nt) that pairs (nt;®t) satisfying (7) form the function nt = m(®t;½t;!t)
concave to the ® axis in Figure 2. 6
6In Figure 2, lim®!0m(¢) < lim®!0l(:) since Kt is less than required to produce Qt
and also satisfy the static e±ciency requirement FN=FK = !=½.
8Steady-state Keynesian solutions for nt and ®t are found in Figure 2 at
the ¯rst intersection of the l(¢) and m(¢) loci. The classical solutions are at
point C on the positively-sloped range of m(¢) where FNt = !t. For given Kt,
the classical pair produce Q¤
t and so q¤
t ´ Q¤
t=Kt positions the l(®t;q¤
t) locus
passing through point C. Since our concern is the sales constrained ¯rm, we
have q < q¤
t and so the l(®t;q) locus lies below point C. Keynesian nt and ®t
are thus both less than their classical counterparts.
In sum, Keynesian solutions for nt; ®t and Ãt are found from (2), the
constraint equation f(nt) ¡ ¸(®t) = q and (7) where ®t¡1 = ®t. From (7)
and (2) it is helpful to derive the Keynesian version of (6):
FKt + ¸0
t ®t ¡ ¸t
(1 ¡ Ãt)¡1 + ¸0
t
= ½t: (8)
These solutions are admissable only if losses are avoided. From (2) and the
expression for pro¯t, (FKt ¡ ®t ¡ ¸t)Kt + (FNt ¡ !t)Nt, this requires
Ãt ¸ ¡
"





In the macro models below, there are competitive ¯rms in each sector and



















93.1 A Classical Model
This model solves recursively. Assuming an inelastic labor supply Nt,
solutions for Ni















t = Nt: (14)
The solutions for Ni
t in turn imply the gross output and the (identical) mar-
ginal products of capital in both sectors. The labor capital ratio in each is
nt ´ Nt=Kt where Kt ´ KK
t + KC
t .
The rates of capital growth ®i
t and the yield on equity ½t are found from

































t in each sector, (15) implies that ®K
t = ®C
t ; that is, there
is a common capital growth rate, call it ®t. Its solution is found from (17).
Equilibrium ½t then follows from (16). Given Ki
t, the solutions for Ni
t and ®t
yield the net outputs from (10) and (11). Note that net consumption sector
output 7 could be expressed as if derived from an aggregate (i.e., one sector)
production function, Ct = F(Nt;Kt) ¡ It ¡ ¸tKt where It = ®tKt.
7In order to `close' the model, an equilibrium condition for consumer goods should be
10The key observation from (12) - (17) is that ½t and ®t are functions
of given Nt and predetermined Ki
t. Nothing requires that ½t exceed ®t to
preclude losses. The conditions under which this requirement is met are next
investigated. It is helpful to specify a Cobb Douglas production function
f(nt) = n±
t where ± 2 (0;1). Given common ®t and de¯ning µ ´ 1+KC
t =KK
t
where µ is predetermined, (17) is compressed to
n
±
t = ¸ + ®tµ: (170)
Next, the no loss condition requires that (for either sector) the LHS of (16)
exceed ®t. This is reduced to FKt > ®t + ¸t, or
(1 ¡±)n
±
t ¸ ® + ¸: (18)
This states that the gross marginal product of capital must be large enough
to ¯nance both the purchase and installation of new capital since labor ab-
sorbs the remaining output when its real wage equals its marginal product.




µ(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1
b ¾
: (19)
This equation speci¯es the maximum admissable (i.e., no loss) rate of capital
growth. Indeed, the RHS of (19) may be negative in which case no positive
speci¯ed. The assumption of an inelastic labor supply could be relaxed so that solutions
for !t and ½t are consistent with household optimization. Alternatively, since the equity
market value of ¯rms and its rate of return have been determined, we could introduce
a second asset, say money, whose real value and/or rate of return adjust to reconcile
households to their output share already determined.
11value for such ®t exists.
Several results now follow. First, since capital growth and the yield on
equity are inversely related from (16), maximum ®t implies a minimum ½t.
Moreover, since nt and ®t are positively related from (170), an upper bound
also exists for the labor capital ratio nt. With Kt predetermined, an em-
ployment maximum thus exists in t which can be less than the exogenous
labor supply or, for that matter, the labor supply chosen by an optimizing
household sector observing the solutions for !t and ½t (see fn. 7 above).
The `second classical postulate' of Keynes (the marginal utility of real wage
income equals the disutility of labor) may not be satis¯ed. Finally, assume
that a full employment temporary equlibrium exists in t. If labor supply
grows at an exogenous rate ¹ greater than ®t, then both the labor capital
ratio and the capital growth rate rise through time. If ¹ is greater than the
RHS of (19), however, this economy cannot converge to a full employment
classical steady state (where ¹ = ®). In ¯nite time, (19) will not be satis¯ed.
The important conclusion is that labor markets may not clear in the
classical model. This outcome will be associated with a downwardly rigid
real interest rate and upwardly rigid investment. A labor intensive economy
with rapid labor supply growth (high ¹) and a large labor share of gross
output (high ±) may not support a full employment classical equilibrium,
particularly if its capital is weighted heavily in the capital sector (low µ).
Several adjustments in the model's speci¯cation could remedy the prob-
12lem. If capital were instead mobile and could produce either output (as in
Uzawa 1969), we would e®ectively have a single sector model and µ could go
to in¯nity if necessary to eliminate any upper bound in (19). Alternatively,
under perfect foresight, it might be assumed that initial µ was set correctly
to evade the constraint in (19). Or, if unemployment appears in a classical
temporary `equilibrium', the competitive markets speci¯cation might then be
abandoned and the relative price of new capital allowed to fall below unity.
In the next section, the solution explored is to abandon the ¯rst classical
postulate and let the real wage fall below labor's marginal product.
3.2 A Keynesian Model
A full employment macro model is presented below in which the `classical'
and `Keynesian' versions appear as two nested cases. The model is speci¯ed
























































13A preliminary solution method for this system now follows. Given pre-
determined capital stocks in each sector, inelastically supplied labor Nt is
allocated by (20) and (22) so that the marginal products of labor (and thus
of capital) are the same in each sector. Since the shadow prices Ãt are also
the same (this is formally established below), (23) (which re°ects (8)) im-
plies that there is a common capital growth rate ®t. Its level is supply side
determined from the capital market equilibrium condition (25). The value
of Ãt is next computed from (26) which re°ects (9). If FKt > ¸t + ®t, then
Ãt = 0 and the system collapses to become the classical model above. With
a reverse inequality, Ãt > 0 and a (zero pro¯t) Keynesian equilibrium exists.
With Ãt so determined, equilibrium !t and ½t are found from (21) and (24)
respectively.
In a Keynesian equilibrium (i.e., with Ãt > 0), aggregate sales constraints
are given by (9) and (10). In order to see why their shadow prices are
identical in (20) - (26), it is helpful to rearrange (20) and (21) to get the
more general form: (1 ¡ ÃK
t )FNK = (1 ¡ ÃC
t )FNC = !t. Next, use (2) to
eliminate the Ãi






t]¡1 appears on each side of this equality, where
Gni
t > 0 and G®i
t < 0. These signs imply that if labor were shifted, for
example, from the capital to consumption sectors so that nK
t < nC
t , it would
be necessary that ®K
t < ®C
t to preserve the equality. A symmetrical exercise





t is required to preserve (23). We conclude
that nC
t = nK
t and so, from (2), a common Ãt is a necessary condition for a
Keynesian equilibrium.
A positive solution for Ãt is seen in (26) to be a function of nt. Recall,
however, the assumption underlying (7), (8), (9) and thus (26) was that
Ãt = Ãt¡1 which required a constant labor capital ratio nt. We conclude
that in the Keynesian case, (20) - (26) must be more narrowly interpreted
as a temporary equilibrium in the steady state. This alters the recursive
solution method from that described above. In the Keynesian steady state,
®t equals the exogenous rate of labor supply growth ¹. The solution for the
steady state labor capital ratio is then found from (25) given the distribution
of installed capital (µ) across sectors. Solutions for nt and ®t imply the
marginal products of both inputs and the values of Ãt; !t and ½t.
Figure 3 about here
The Keynesian equilibrium is characterized in Figure 3 which is a variation
on Figure 1 in Barro and Grossman (1971). It characterizes here full employ-
ment, not an excess supply of labor as in that paper. The locus LBD is the
short-run marginal product of labor schedule and conventional labor demand
curve under competitive conditions. Maximum employment in the classical
model is ^ N where ^ N < N (the classical real wage would be F ^ N). The rein-
forced locus LBC is the Keynesian demand for labor curve. The `kink' at N,
15with an inelastic range for real wages below FN, re°ects the ¯rm perception
that more output from additional employment cannot be sold. For real wage
!¤ = FN(1 ¡ Ã), the sales constrained output would be produced at zero
pro¯t. Labor demand N¤, read o® the conventional demand locus LBD at
!¤, would be `notional' in the sense of Clower (1965), not only because ¯rms
believe that more output cannot be sold but also because even if it could, it
would generate a loss.
While the discussion above assumed a zero pro¯t Keynesian equilibrium,
it should be clear that a positive minimum pro¯t target would require an even
lower real wage. Given an inelastic labor supply, a solution for real wages
(and real pro¯t) appears indeterminate. These might be found, however,
if the distribution of income were added to the mechanisms listed above
(see fn. 6) to clear the consumer goods market. In the spirit of traditional
Keynesianism, the role of °exible real wages would then be to ensure su±cient
demand for output, not to clear the labor market.
Finally, observe that unlike its role as the interest rate `°oor' in the clas-
sical model, the rate of investment becomes an interest rate `ceiling' in the
Keynesian model. From (8) and (9) met with equality we get:
½t = ® ¡
"
(1 ¡Ãt)ÃtFNn + ®Ãt
1 + ¸0(1 ¡ Ãt)
#
: (27)
The real interest rate is necessarily less than the rate of capital accumula-
tion. In general, (6) and (8) will piece together a downward sloping marginal
e±ciency of investment schedule in (½; ®) space. The classical range of this
16schedule lies above the 45± ray from the origin and the Keynesian range be-
low it. More generally, we conclude that in the transition from a state of
classical unemployment to that of (steady state) Keynesian full employment,
a fall in both the real wage and the real interest rate would be observed.
4 Conclusion
Downward in°exibility in real wages and/or real interest rates are the
traditional causes of low output and high unemployment. Nothing in this
paper changes that general conclusion. What is changed are the roles of the
¯rst classical postulate and demand constraints on output sales. The classical
equality of the real wage and labor's marginal product is itself a rigidity lead-
ing to potential labor market disequilibrium which can be resolved through
the perception by ¯rms of constraints on output sales.
17Appendix
In this appendix, it is established that the relative price of uninstalled
new capital to consumption goods is one. In general, the objective function






where PQ; PI and ! are the real (i.e., consumption good) prices of output,
uninstalled new capital and labor respectively. The equivalents of (2), (3),
(4) and (5) in the main text are
PQ FNt = ! (A 2)
V (¢t+1)Kt+1 = PI + ¸
0
t (A 3)
V (¢t+1)Kt+1 ¡ V (¢t)Kt = ½tV (¢t)Kt ¡ (PQ[FKt ¡ ¸t] + ®t¸
0
t) (A 4)
PI½t ¡PQFKt + ¸
0
t¡1(1 + ½t) = ¸
0
t(1 + ®t) ¡ PQ: (A 5)
In the limit, real pro¯t is (½ ¡ ®)(PI + ¸0K) which requires ½ > ® to be
positive. Assuming the explicit quadratic form ¸(®t) = b®2
t, the solution for
the rate of capital growth any period t is
®t =
½t ¡ [½2





In this model, there are two speci¯c cases to consider. For the consumption
good sector we have PQ ´ 1 and for the capital goods sector we have PQ ´ PI.
18From (A 6), this yields
®
C


















t and ½t, note that (A 7) and (A 8) are two equations in three
unknowns: ®C
t ®K












t ; (A 9)
where nK
t follows from (A 2) for given !t. Since the same relative price PI
is found in the next period, the `horizontal shifts' in both the demand and
supply curves for new capital across periods must be the same. In t + 1,





t (1 + ®
C
t ) = (f(n
K




t (1 + ®
K
t ) (A 10)
From (A 9) and (A 10) we see that ®C
t = ®K
t . It follows from inspection of
(A 7) and (A 8) that identical ®i
t, in each sector imply that PI = 1.
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